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Abstract: The primary aim of this study was to assess the degree of Poland’s con-
vergence in terms of price stability, both at the stage of the country’s candidacy to the 
euro area and in relation to the euro convergence criteria (the so-called Maastricht 
criteria), and in the broader context of the ECB’s unified monetary policy. The time 
frame for this study covers the period of 2004–2017. The starting point marks Po-
land’s accession to the EU, which is a pre-requisite for application to access the euro 
area. The closing time was chosen due to the availability of data, mainly from the Eu-
rostat database. This was studied in view of the critical analysis of methodology and 
the method used to establish the Maastricht criterion for the dynamics of the general 
price level. The methodology of determining the inflation criterion is flawed and not 
matched to today’s economic conditions, including the definition of price stability ap-
plied in the practice of central banking, as well as in the context of the phenomenon of 
deflation commonly occurring in the last decade. As a consequence, the value of the 
criterion for a candidate country may turn out to be very low, and may unjustifiably 
increase the costs of accession to the euro area, also in the long-term perspective. Such 
a problem should be taken into account in the discussion on Poland’s accession to the 
euro area, which is usually of a political, as well as social and economic nature. This 
economic aspect, however, should be key in practice.
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Introduction
European integration processes lasting many decades now have been strongly connected with the process of convergence, understood as 
the process of economies becoming increasingly similar, which leads to 
their convergence. On the one hand, convergence is a pre-condition for 
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integration, while on the other hand it is its objective, which is to con-
tribute to the socio-economic growth and development of united Europe. 
When we consider the European Union (EU) and the euro area (EA) as 
a certain stage in the overall integration process (Molle, 2000, part I ff.), 
which may be termed as an incomplete economic and monetary union 
(De Grauwe, 2003, pp. 107–140; Zwierzchlewski, 2015, Chapter 1), we 
need to stress that certain conditions need to be met to participate, such 
as those related to economic convergence, both in terms of membership 
of the EU and next also of the EA. In turn, accession to such associations 
may promote convergence, as indicated e.g. by the structure and scale 
of the EU budget. Fiscal policy in Europe is primarily executed at the 
national level (both central and local governments), while the EU budget 
is mainly to ensure redistribution in order to enhance socio-economic co-
hesion within more specific areas (see EU budget structure). However, 
its excessive growth and incorporation of a wider range of fiscal func-
tions outside the area of convergence are considered disadvantageous, as 
evidenced by the limit for its volume established at 1.24% of the GDP of 
member countries.1
Also in the monetary (currency) aspect, convergence is inseparably 
associated with European integration. In this sense, it refers first of all to 
the Maastricht criteria as pre-conditions for accession to the euro area. 
However, these should not be considered solely as boundary conditions 
to be met in order to access the European Monetary Union, but rather as 
a completion and verification of the conclusion for the convergence proc-
ess in relation to the applicant country. This study is focused on the cri-
terion related to price stability and more broadly speaking – to the entire 
convergence process in this area in view of accession and membership in 
the Monetary Union (compare Ochryniuk, Rogut, 2010). This is connect-
ed with serious problems, not only for the euro area candidate country 
which has to meet the requirement not only before, but also after acces-
sion; a problem lies also in the methodology of establishing the criterion 
itself. The above-mentioned problems discussed within this study have 
a significant impact on the balance of costs and benefits connected with 
accession to the zone of the common European currency (De Grauwe, 
2003, Chapters 1–4). Divergence in the dynamics of the general price 
level not only hinders accession to the euro area and makes it more costly, 
but also leads to incompatibility with the EU’s unified monetary policy of 
1 For more on the EU budget and its rules see: e.g. Zombirt (2008, pp. 455–489).
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the European Central Bank (ECB) and generates resulting participation 
costs (Błaszczyk, 2016).
This is a particularly important issue from the point of view of the chal-
lenges of economic policy in Poland in the face of accession to the euro 
area. An economic analysis of the balance of costs and benefits should be 
the basis for the discussion on making the final political decision on the 
date of accession – a decision which, however, is not only political and 
economic, but also social in nature.2 Our decision-makers should con-
sider a number of factors regarding both the pre-accession process and 
the conditions of belonging to the euro area, particularly in the face of 
the crisis situations in European economic and monetary union in the 
last decade (Walkowski, 2012). It should be emphasized that this article 
focuses mainly on economic and monetary aspects of convergence with 
the euro area.
In this context, the primary aim of this paper is to assess the degree of 
Poland’s convergence in terms of price stability, both at the stage of our 
candidacy to the euro area and in relation to the Maastricht criteria, and in 
the broader context of the ECB’s unified monetary policy. These aspects 
were studied in relation to the critical analysis of the methodology and 
the method used to establish the Maastricht criterion for the dynamics of 
the general price level. The time frame for the study covers the period of 
2004–2017. The starting point marks Poland’s accession to the EU, which 
is a pre-requisite for the application to access the euro area. The closing 
time point results from the availability of data, mainly in relation to the 
Eurostat database.
This study is composed of two basic parts. One concerns the method-
ology for the Maastricht inflation criterion.3 A critical analysis of it was 
performed, indicating its incompatibility with current economic condi-
tions, particularly in view of the definitions of price stability applied in 
central banking practice, as well as the deflation phenomena observed in 
the last decade. The paper presents the phenomena which should be con-
2 For a broad look at the balance of costs and benefits of Poland’s accession to the 
euro area against the background of the economic convergence process see: e.g. NBP 
(2009), Wójcik (2008), Pronobis (2008), Szeląg (1998).
3 In view of the potential inclusion of reference countries experiencing deflation 
in the establishment of the criterion, the term inflation	criterion is incorrect. It should 
rather be referred to as price stability or dynamics of the general price level. However, 
in view of common use it was decided also to use the phrase inflation	criterion in 
this study.
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sidered in the adaptation of the methodology, e.g. in the context of Mon-
etary Union, to be applied in the regional variation in the dynamics of the 
general price level. In the following part, several variants for changes in 
the methodology of the Maastricht inflation criterion are presented, and 
then in this context nominal convergence in Poland is assessed.
1. Price stability and the Maastricht inflation criterion
The Maastricht inflation criterion is one of the five primary nominal 
pre-conditions for accession to the EA. The other criteria concern long-
term interest rates and government debt, as well as exchange rates. The 
idea underlying these criteria is to achieve and maintain a specific degree 
of convergence which will determine the balance of costs and benefits of 
EA membership. Economic convergence of the countries promotes the in-
creased effectiveness and efficiency of the ECB’s unified monetary policy. 
Countries which deviate from the EA average may incur losses resulting 
from the incompatibility of the unified policy with domestic economic 
conditions, particularly the dynamics of the general price level. This may 
result in one of the most often stressed threats for accession to the EA, 
i.e. loss of autonomy in monetary and exchange rate policies. In the case 
of monetary divergence, the unified ECB instruments, established based 
on the average parameters for EA and considering a 2% inflation target, 
may be unsuitable for countries unable to meet the fixed parameters. For 
example, in countries with the lowest inflation rates, or even deflation, the 
EU monetary policy would become too restrictive (due to the high real 
rate), having a negative effect on employment rates and domestic product, 
while in countries with higher inflation rates it would be too expansive 
(due to the low real rate), promoting further increases in inflation, instead 
of stabilizing it at the level of the EA target. As a result, on the one hand 
the situation on the labor market would deteriorate, while on the other 
hand inflation trends would accelerate, e.g. in relation to the expected 
inflation rate. In contrast, if convergence is properly executed, taking into 
consideration long-term forecasts, and not only in view of meeting the 
Maastricht criteria, the above-mentioned autonomy of national policies 
will never be needed (or will only be needed rarely) and the unified ECB 
policy will prove sufficient.
The idea of the inflation criterion for convergence is thus particularly 
positive in the context of European integration, a process currently ob-
served at the level of economic and monetary policies, having already 
covered the level of markets both for goods and services and factors of 
production, including e.g. the stages of the free trade zone, customs union 
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or the common market (Molle, 2000). However, doubts may be raised 
on the one hand by the methodology used to establish this criterion4 and 
on the other hand – by its implementation by the candidate countries and 
their EA counterparts.
In relation to the concept of reaching a high level of sustainable con-
vergence within the euro area, the Treaty stipulates that one of the condi-
tions is “the achievement of a high degree of price stability; this will be 
apparent from a rate of inflation which is close to that of, at most, the three 
best performing Member States in terms of price stability” (Article 140 of 
the Treaty	on	the	Functioning	of	the	European	Union). According to Ar-
ticle 1 of the Protocol	on	the	Convergence	Criteria the level of inflation 
in a given country within the year preceding the analysis may not exceed 
the inflation rates in the three EU states with the most stable price levels 
expressed in terms of HICP (Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices) by 
more than 1.5 pp. The method of identifying reference countries raises 
doubts. It is difficult to clearly define the term “best performing Member 
States in terms of price stability.” Price stability can be an ambiguous 
concept (Błaszczyk, 2010), particularly in relation to the quantitative as-
pect. Apart from the other aspects of the definition of price stability, par-
ticularly disregarding its potential measurement through the price level 
path, and assuming the rate of change in the general price level, its target 
value needs to be considered (Błaszczyk, 2010).
The European Commission is not consistent in the identification of 
reference states, and thus in defining “the best performance in terms 
of price stability.” Generally, countries with the lowest mean annual rate 
of inflation are selected. A problem appeared in the case of zero and nega-
tive dynamics of the general price level. For example, in 2004, in the 
Reports	on	Convergence the European Committee decided to eliminate 
Lithuania from the group of reference countries, which at that time was 
experiencing deflation measured using HICP. However, already in 2010, 
with several EU countries reporting deflation (Ireland, Portugal, Estonia, 
Belgium, Spain) the European Commission arbitrarily decided only to 
eliminate Ireland, with the highest deflation rate, from the reference state 
group. In the following years, when deflation was recorded worldwide, 
in relation to decreasing prices of raw materials on the world markets, 
including oil, countries with deflation were not rejected.
4 An interesting collection of studies on the validity of the definition of price 
stability as well as the entire ECB monetary policy strategy is available from the ECB 
(2003).
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In such a situation, apart from the fact that the investigated criterion 
is relative in character and its variability may cause uncertainty regarding 
an EA candidate country, it may prove to be undesirably low, including 
values close to zero, or even hypothetically negative. We may thus ques-
tion whether it is justified to meet such a ‘reduced’ criterion, due to the 
potential forcing of a considerable restriction of economic policy and re-
lated unjustified high costs. For example, a situation may arise in which 
a candidate country would have to reduce an inflation level which under 
normal conditions would be considered advantageous and optimal (e.g. 
2.5%), to values considered harmful (close, equal to or below zero), since 
this is indicated by the current situation in the euro area, specifically in 
relation to only the three countries with the lowest price dynamics. Sur-
prisingly, the value of the criterion may be incompatible with the ECB’s 
definition of price stability, indicating 2% inflation, while the idea behind 
the implementation of this criterion is to achieve convergence with the 
euro area and adaptation to the ‘average’ unified ECB policy, which de-
termines the long-term benefits from EA membership. Why is the value of 
the criterion to be determined by countries with the lowest price dynamics 
(irrespective of the addition of 1.5 pp to the mean price dynamics in those 
countries) and not, for example, those with medium dynamics, since the 
ECB policy refers mainly to such a parameter? Thus, it is necessary to 
discuss the redefinition of the price stability criterion, or at least to clearly 
specify the concept of countries with the greatest price stability. To do 
this, the notion of price stability needs to be analyzed.
It would seem that price stability is equivalent to zero inflation. How-
ever, hypothetically price stability may be defined in terms of a negative, 
zero or positive rate of change in the general price level. Each solution 
has its advantages and disadvantages; however, both empirical studies and 
central banking practice definitely indicate a positive inflation target. The 
value most commonly applied by countries using the direct inflation target-
ing strategy, assuming price stability as a primary objective, and specified 
explicitly in the form of the inflation target falls within the range of 2–3% 
(Błaszczyk, 2010). For example, inflation targets of the oldest central banks 
worldwide, i.e. Sveriges Riksbank and the Bank of England, amount to 2%, 
similarly as it is for the Federal Reserve System (since 2012) and the Bank 
of Japan (since 2013). At present, the ECB defines price stability as infla-
tion below 2%, but close to that value, whereas for the National Bank of 
Poland NBP it is 2.5% +/– 1 pp. Discussions on price stability indicate that 
the reference countries being best performers in terms of price stability in 
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relation to the Maastricht criterion should have this specified inflation level. 
Taking into consideration the EU countries, and at the same time candidate 
or EA countries, the term “the greatest price stability” should refer to the 
ECB target, i.e. approx. 2% or slightly below that value, such as 1.5–2% 
and possibly also above, considering the symmetry of the inflation target. 
Thus, the candidate countries would strive to attain a target, which will later 
be binding within the ECB’s unified monetary policy.
From the point of view of both the society and the economy, many 
factors indicate the advisability of establishing a positive (non-zero and 
non-negative) inflation target reflecting the optimal dynamics of the gen-
eral price level. They include e.g.:
downward nominal wage rigidity (Akerlof, Dickens, Perry, 1996, pp.  –
1–59; Akerlof, Dickens, Perry, 2000; Keynes, 2003, pp. 231–244; 
Kwiatkowski, 2002, p. 105; Wojtyna, 2004, p. 202; for Japan: Kimura, 
Ueda, 1997; for the USA: Lebow, Saks, Wilson, 2003; for Switzer-
land: Fehr, Goette, 2000; for Germany: Knoppik, Beissinger, 2001: 
for Sweden: Ekberg, 2002; for Great Britain: Nickell, Quintini, 2003, 
and for Italy: Devicienti, 2004);
nominal interest rate floor (Wojtyna, 2001; IMF, 1999, p. 101; Sven- –
sson, 2000, pp. 27–28, 41);
risk of deflation (Kumar, Baig, Decressin, Faulkner-MacDonagh,  –
Feyzioglu, 2003; Kilian, Manganelli, 2007, pp. 561–588);
overestimation of actual dynamics of the general price level (mainly  –
CPI and similar measures) (Social Security Administration, 1996; 
Friedman, 2002, pp. 89–90, Wynne, Rodriguez-Palenzuela, 2002);
seigniorage (Cukrowski, 2001); –
regional variation in dynamics of the general price level in the Mon- –
etary Union (Weber, Beck, 2005; Wójcik, 2008, pp. 106–142; Alda-
soro, Zdarek 2009; Błaszczyk, 2014; Błaszczyk, 2016).
In order to present these aspects in terms of the identification of the 
inflation target we may use formula 1.
 Π* = Π
E 
+ max {Π
DNWR
, Π
DNIRB
, ΠDT, ΠRVPD ...} (1)
where:
Π* – value of the inflation target,
Π
E 
– value of error for inflation measurement,
Π
DNWR
 – inflation rate considering downward nominal wage rigidity,
Π
DNIRB
 – inflation rate constituting downward bound against nominal in-
terest rate floor,
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ΠDT – inflation rate hedging against other deflation threats, e.g. liquidity 
trap or deflation spiral,
Π
RVPD 
– inflation rate considering regional variation in price dynamics 
within the Monetary Union.
The beginning of the formula needs to include an error for the meas-
ured dynamics in the general price level, above all overestimation. 
Preferably, the errors should be eliminated, rather than included in the 
target value. Thus, the factor differs from the others indicated in the 
procedure, since their incorporation is, in reality, required to attain the 
target inflation rate. The other phenomena are substitutionary in relation 
to one another, i.e. the maximum inflation value resulting from each of 
them provides a buffer against all the others. For this reason, this value 
is added to the measurement error. The formula ends with an ellipsis to 
indicate that other factors, more or less directly associated with defla-
tion conditions, may be included, e.g. inflation rate generated by the 
profits from seigniorage. In view of current monetary policy, including 
the independence of central banks, this argument is increasingly losing 
importance, particularly in relation to Monetary Union. Estimates for 
individual factors in this formula will differ for individual countries/
unions, and thus it is impossible to indicate a universal optimal value of 
inflation target.
In the case of monetary union, such as in the euro area, an additional 
factor will be connected with the regional diversity in the dynamics of 
the general price level. This results first of all from the asymmetry of 
shocks affecting various countries, and differences in the mechanisms 
of their transmission. The reasons may stem from the regulations of the 
product and labor markets (Moretti, 2014). In this context we should 
also stress the role of the Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson effect (H-B-S). It 
affects mainly those countries which are characterized by a relatively 
high growth rate in the production efficiency of exchangeable goods. 
This increase leads indirectly to a real, absorbable appreciation of cur-
rency, or nominal appreciation, or through a greater growth rate for do-
mestic prices. According to the H-B-S model, this mechanism consists 
of a rapid growth in productivity in the exchangeable goods sector, lead-
ing to an increase in wages in that sector. This is because prices for 
those goods are exogenous, and are determined on the world market. 
Since we are dealing with perfect capital mobility between the sectors 
of exchangeable and non-exchangeable goods, wages in the latter sec-
tor will also increase. However, the growth rate in productivity is lower. 
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The increase in wages will be reflected in the growth of prices in the 
non-exchangeable goods sector and as a consequence – in an increase 
in the general price level.
Finally, countries with a high productivity growth rate (first of all 
small, open emerging economies) will potentially have higher inflation in 
comparison to countries with a lower growth rate, but not a lower level of 
productivity (primarily more developed countries) (Chmielewski, 2003). 
Inflation resulting from the H-B-S effect may be considered ‘good.’ This 
may be termed as resulting from a reduced distance between more and 
less developed economies. For this reason, it is not advisable to take ac-
tions to reduce such inflation. It should be first included in the ECB infla-
tion target, and secondly it needs to be incorporated in the methodology 
for the Maastricht criterion.
An empirical assessment of regional differences in the general price 
level dynamics in the euro area, as compared to that in the entire EU in 
the years of 2004–2017, is presented in Fig. 1.
The data given in the top section of Fig. 1 refer to the maximum, 
minimum and average price dynamics in EA countries. We can observe 
a considerable variation in these values at the simultaneous extensive 
deviations between them, which show no definite upward or downward 
trend. It is also evident in the bottom figure as considerable changes in 
the range, which for the EA falls within the range of <2.2, 6.3>, while 
for standard deviation it is <0.63, 1.25>. In view of the low values of 
inflation rates in the euro area countries and the ECB inflation target 
itself, these differences turn out to be relatively large. It should also be 
stressed here that the variation for the entire EU in the analyzed period 
is much broader than for the euro area. In this case, the range is <2.7, 
13.1>, while standard deviation is <0.62, 2.28>. Nevertheless, a posi-
tive result is connected with the increasing convergence of both meas-
ures for the EA and the EU in recent years, particularly since 2014.5 
However, regional differences in the general price level dynamics in the 
EA are evident, and this fact should be taken into consideration both in 
the methodology for the criterion of nominal convergence and the value 
of the ECB inflation target.
5 Cf. research on the differences in price dynamics in the euro area with the use 
of an interesting, different econometric methodology. The authors come to the conclu-
sion, which is confirmed in this article, that the analyzed differences should disappear 
in the future, and additionally do not undermine the legitimacy of the inflation target 
of the ECB (Weber, Beck, 2005).
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Fig. 1. Assessment of regional differences in the general price level  
dynamics in the euro area, as compared to that of the entire  
European Union 2004–2017
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2. Assessment of Poland’s nominal convergence with the euro area 
in terms of the general price level dynamics
The aim of the empirical study was to assess Poland’s convergence 
with the euro area in terms of price dynamics, both in terms of short-term 
compliance to the Maastricht criterion and long-term prospects for con-
formity to the ECB’s unified monetary policy. The analyzed period was 
set as the years 2004–2017. The starting point marks Poland’s accession 
to the EU and the resulting possibility to apply for accession to the euro 
area. The closing time point is connected with the availability of data 
for analysis.
Convergence was assessed taking into consideration both the Maas-
tricht criterion in its original form, and the authors’ proposal of a meth-
odology formulated based on the observations presented in the previous 
chapter of this paper. In this context, several solutions modifying the 
methodology for this criterion need to be proposed.
Eliminating from the EU reference group those countries, in which • 
deflation is recorded, and instead considering only countries with zero 
and/or positive price dynamics, or possibly the adoption of a minimum 
value of the criterion e.g. at 15%. In this way, a guarantee could be 
provided for a protection barrier against deflation amounting to 1.5 pp. 
A comparison of such a determined criterion to the methodology failing 
to exclude countries experiencing deflation is presented in Fig. 2.
Establishment of the criterion at the level of the ECB inflation target • 
with an admissible fluctuation barrier, e.g. an arbitrary 0.5 pp. In this 
way, we would ensure the stability of the criterion and the constancy 
of its value for the candidate country, while the target would be sym-
metrical in character, i.e. it would treat inflation and deflation threats 
equally, taking into consideration the antideflation barrier of 1.5 pp, 
and additionally it would refer to the value which will be binding in 
the long-term perspective of EA membership (Fig. 3).
Establishment of the criterion at the level of average price dynamics • 
in the euro area with the admissible fluctuation barrier, identified, for 
example, based on the statistics concerning variation in price dynam-
ics within the EA (standard deviation, range, etc., see Fig. 3). The 
strength of this variant stems from the fact that it refers to the situation 
in which the current average price dynamics in the euro area deviates 
from the target value of 2%. In this way, thus established, the crite-
rion would more effectively refer to the current economic situation, 
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and it would refer to the EA rather than the entire EU. Additionally, 
this variant would take into consideration the general price level dy-
namics as an argument in the discussion on the inflation target value 
(see formula 1). This methodology may also be supplemented by the 
minimum upper level for the criterion (e.g. 1.5% or 2% – compare the 
ECB target) (Fig. 3).
Price dynamics in Poland (HICP) in view of such formulated variants 
of the criteria in the years 2004–2017 are presented in Figs. 2 and 3. In 
Fig. 2, we can observe considerable differences in the criterion values 
when comparing the original methodology assuming the incorporation 
of reference countries experiencing deflation and the values obtained 
when the above-mentioned countries are excluded from the analysis. The 
differences are mainly evident in the years 2009–2010, i.e. during the 
global financial and economic crisis, and 2013–2016, i.e. in the face of 
downward trends in raw material prices, including oil prices on global 
markets. In those years, except for 2013, the value of the criterion when 
deflation was not excluded from analysis was dangerously low, drop-
ping below 1%. During the 14 investigated years, Poland would have 
met the criterion 8 times, including the last 5 years, and interestingly, 
this would be the case irrespective of the potential exclusion of the coun-
tries experiencing deflation. In recent years, despite the low value of the 
criterion, price dynamics in Poland were also very low, and consistent 
with the global trends in this respect in view of decreasing raw material 
prices. This convergence was found under the effect of demand factors, 
whereas during the crisis and the resulting negative demand shock (e.g. 
in 2009) it was no longer observed. Macroeconomically, in that period, 
our economy was in relatively good shape6 and for this reason it was not 
subject to deflationary processes. However, if at that time it had been 
necessary to meet the Maastricht criterion, restrictive monetary (or pos-
sibly fiscal) policies would have been required in order to adapt to the 
‘unnaturally’ low criterion value, generating tremendous socio-economic 
costs as a consequence. Additionally, taking into consideration reference 
countries experiencing deflation would cause an absurd situation (see Fig. 
2) in which in some years the ECB itself would not meet the Maastricht 
criterion (see average price dynamics for the EA). Such a controversial 
situation clearly shows the flaws of the currently applied methodology for 
6 It is evidenced by studies applying an original method based on a multifactorial 
economic assessment measure (Błaszczyk, 2015).
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the Maastricht inflation criterion and thus it confirms the advisability of 
its adjustment.
Thus, we can propose the exclusion of countries experiencing defla-
tion (Fig. 2) from the current methodology, which would result in the 
minimum value of the criterion being 1.5%, i.e. at a level which in eco-
nomic central banking practice refers to the lower values considered opti-
mal in relation to price stability (compare the inflation target for Poland). 
For example, such a methodological approach applied for the middle of 
the 2009 crisis and under the global deflation trends in 2014–2016 would 
result in the criterion value being arbitrarily limited and never dropping 
below 1%, i.e. a value inconsistent with the contemporary definitions of 
price stability in Europe and worldwide. Additionally, average price dy-
namics in the EA would take values below the criterion limit.
Fig. 2. Price dynamics in Poland and the EA in the years 2004–2017 in view 
of the original methodology for the Maastricht criterion and following  
the exclusion of countries experiencing deflation
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While convergence in price dynamics is crucial in view of overall 
economic integration in Europe, and at the present stage of compliance 
with the unified monetary policy of the Monetary Union, a question arises 
whether it should be verified in relation to EU member states, or rather 
to countries with the lowest price dynamics. This is a major issue, since 
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the candidate country, in order to reduce the costs related to the loss of 
autonomy in the monetary and exchange rate policies and the resulting 
potential threat to the unified monetary policy, should adapt in terms of 
price dynamics to the average trend in the euro area. It is the EA aver-
age, rather than the lowest price dynamics in the EU, that is the primary 
benchmark for actions undertaken by the ECB and an element of the im-
pulse response function. Nevertheless, the former should be taken into 
consideration within the multiparametric approach, including regional 
variation in price dynamics (compare below).
For this reason, we need to consider the methodology of the crite-
rion referring to the ECB inflation target with the admissible fluctua-
tion barrier arbitrarily established at, say, 0.5%. In Figure 3, the upper 
and lower values of such a determined criterion are marked with black 
and red broken lines (the target plus 0.5, the target minus 0.5). In view 
of the above, Poland would have serious problems with meeting the 
accession criterion. The price dynamics is so unstable that it would 
have fallen within the target range only in 2017, while it would have 
exceeded it 7 times and been below it 5 times. While the proposed 
methodology is justified logically and factually, in practice it might 
prove too harsh for candidate countries (for comparison, see price dy-
namics for the EA).
Since price dynamics do not always need to comply with the ECB 
target, e.g. due to global demand or supply trends, including those result-
ing from raw material prices, the next proposed change in the criterion 
methodology refers to the average price dynamics in the EA. The cri-
terion would include admissible upward and downward fluctuations by 
the value of standard deviation, possibly including the minimum value 
of the criterion for the upper limit at 1.5 or 2% (which would refer to the 
ECB target and ‘safe’ inflation values). This approach to a certain degree 
would take into consideration regional variations in price dynamics and 
the H-B-S effect. Such a specified criterion is shown in Fig. 3 as the black 
(stand. dev. plus) and red (stand. dev. minus) dotted lines. In view of 
the above, Poland would have met the criterion requirements 8 times, it 
would have exceeded it 3 times, and Poland would have failed twice to 
reach the lower limit by a slight margin.
This may be generally considered to be a good result, on the one 
hand showing the correct choice of criterion methodology, while on the 
other hand indicating the convergence of price dynamics in Poland with 
that in the euro area. The first conclusion is difficult to verify defini-
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tively. However, further studies need to be conducted on the authors’ 
proposal for optimal inflation, focusing on the uniformity of the mon-
etary policy and price differentiations in the Monetary Union, even if it 
seems factually sound and compliant with economic practice in terms 
of price stability.
The second conclusion is doubtful, since price dynamics (see Figs. 2 
and 3) in Poland for the entire period of analysis differed from that of the 
EA and were less stable (except for 2017, with 1.6% and 1.5%, respec-
tively). In certain years, the price dynamic was greater, while in others it 
was lower. The average for the 2004–2017 period for Poland was higher 
and amounted to 2.1%, whereas for the EA it was 1.7%. The weak con-
vergence of price dynamics in Poland to that of the EA is presented more 
comprehensively in Fig. 4 in relation to price levels (and not as previously 
– the rate of changes in price dynamics).
Fig. 3. Price dynamics in Poland and the EA in the years 2004–2017  
in view of proposed changes in the Maastricht criterion methodology
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Fig. 4. Price levels in Poland and in the EA in the years 2004–2017  
with 2005 as the benchmark
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In this approach, considerable convergence was observed in the period 
until the global financial and economic crisis of the first decade of the 
21st century. Next, we can observe an increase in price levels in Poland 
above the EA level, which is consistent with the fact that in a developing 
country increased GDP dynamics B is accompanied by price dynamics. 
The divergence in price levels stopped around 2013. Since then, we can 
observe a degree of stabilization or even slight progress in convergence 
for both time series.
Conclusion
The Polish economy is undergoing a continuous convergence process, 
as it is developing in the context of European integration, and – particu-
larly – of the possible accession to the euro area. The necessary pre-con-
dition for the adoption of euro is connected with meeting the Maastricht 
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criteria. In recent years, we have been witnessing progress in this field, 
particularly in fiscal aspects. In terms of the monetary sphere analyzed in 
this paper, particularly the general price level dynamics, in recent years 
the inflation criterion would also have been met, both in terms of its origi-
nal methodology and the authors’ original proposal to adjust it.
However, this does not mean that the monetary authorities may have 
no concerns over meeting the inflation criterion in the future, when the 
political decision on accession to the euro area is finally made. In con-
trast, due to the relative character of this criterion its value is not certain. 
In particular, the European and global economic situation, by affecting 
domestic price dynamics including the reference countries, strongly de-
termines its level. The last decade at the global demand and supply eco-
nomic shocks and deflation showed that it may be very low, even close 
to zero. There is no consensus on the identification of reference countries 
experiencing deflation. As a consequence the criterion value may prove 
very low, inconsistent with the ECB inflation target, and more broadly 
with the definition of price stability applied in central banking practice 
both in Europe and worldwide. Such a situation may irrationally increase 
the costs associated with accession to the euro area also in the longer 
time frame.
The methodology for establishing the Maastricht inflation criterion 
should be modified to take into consideration the threat of excessively low 
inflation, such as for example downward nominal wage rigidity, the lower 
nominal interest rate limit as well as regional variation in price dynamics 
in the Monetary Union. On the one hand, this methodology needs to treat 
the inflation and deflation threat symmetrically, while on the other hand it 
should also refer both to the average price dynamics in the euro area and 
the ECB inflation target. The proposals contained in this paper meet these 
requirements; nevertheless, further studies need to be conducted, e.g. also 
including the experiences of countries other than Poland.
It should be taken into account that Poland’s accession to the euro 
area, which has the status of a country with a derogation, is basically 
a foregone conclusion. The question is not whether we want to enter the 
Economic and Monetary Union, but when? The decision is mainly con-
ditioned by political will. The current economic situation, in particular 
with regard to the nominal Maastricht criteria, is beneficial and provides 
real grounds for their fulfillment in the coming years. Rational decision-
makers, in determining the date of accession, should therefore take into 
account social and economic factors, including the criterion of price sta-
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bility considered here, and not only purely political premises, including 
electoral ones.
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Ocena konwergencji dynamiki cen w perspektywie akcesji Polski  
do strefy euro ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem deflacji  
 
Streszczenie
Podstawowym celem opracowania jest ocena stopnia konwergencji Polski w za-
kresie stabilności cen, zarówno na etapie kandydowania do strefy euro i w odniesieniu 
do kryteriów z Maastricht, jak i w szerszym ujęciu w kontekście jednolitej polityki 
pieniężnej EBC. Zakres czasowy badania obejmuje okres 2004–2017. Dolna cezura 
czasowa wynika z przystąpienia Polski do UE, co warunkuje możliwość ubiegania się 
o przynależność do strefy euro. Górna cezura czasowa wynika z dostępności danych, 
głównie w odniesieniu do Eurostat. Realizacja celu została dokonana na tle analizy 
krytycznej metodyki i sposobu wyznaczania kryterium z Maastricht dotyczącego dy-
namiki ogólnego poziomu cen. Metodyka wyznaczania kryterium inflacyjnego jest 
wadliwa i niedopasowana do współczesnych uwarunkowań gospodarczych, w tym 
na tle definicji stabilności cen stosowanych w praktyce bankowości centralnej, a tak-
że w kontekście zjawiska deflacji powszechnie występującego w ostatniej dekadzie. 
W konsekwencji wartość kryterium dla kraju kandydującego może okazać się bar-
dzo niska i może w nieuzasadniony sposób zwiększać koszty akcesji do strefy euro, 
również w długim horyzoncie czasowym. Taki problem powinien być uwzględniany 
w dyskusji na temat akcesji Polski do strefy euro, która przeważnie ma charakter poli-
tyczny i dalej społeczny oraz ekonomiczny. To aspekt ekonomiczny jednak powinien 
być w praktyce kluczowy.
 
Słowa kluczowe: deflacja, integracja gospodarcza, strefa euro, polityka pieniężna, 
stabilność cen
